2020년 8월 28일 금요일

Excerpts from “What is Genealogy?” by Mark Bevir in Journal of the Philosophical History 2

A genealogy is a historical narrative that explains an aspect of human life by showing how it came into being… Genealogy as historical narrative may have no clear origin, but it is associated primarily with Friedrich Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals and more recently Michel Foucault’s Discipline and Punish. For Nietzsche and Foucault, genealogy serves a critical purpose, exposing the contingent and “shameful” origins of cherished ideas and entrenched practices.

Genealogy is a vague and general concept, and a theory of genealogy should recognize this generality by leaving room for debate about the several themes it highlights.

This essay stands in sharp contrast to pious but empty invocations of genealogy as inherently critical. It offers a robust philosophical account of genealogy that concentrates on its relation to radical historicism to suggest what epistemic commitments it entails and how it functions as critique.

Radical Historicism

Genealogy arose in the context of nineteenth century historicism.

Historicist modes of reasoning were commonplace throughout the nineteenth century… Philosophers and social theorists of all persuasions conceived of human life, and sometimes even the natural world, as defined by creative and purposeful intentionality… Nineteenth century historicism was almost always developmental. It conceived of history as guided or structured by certain principles.

Radical historicism does away with appeals to principles that lend necessity and unity to history. The result is a powerful emphasis on: nominalism, contingency, and contestability.

I. Nominalism

Historicists generally conceive of human life as unfolding against historical background… In contrast, radical historicists lean toward a nominalist conception of actions and practices and the traditions informing them.

II. Contingency

Radical historicists thus portray history as discontinuous and contingent. History is a series of contingent even accidental appropriations, modifications, and transformations from the old to the new.

III. Contestability

An emphasis on contingency implies that history is radically open in that what happens is always contestable… In doing so, radical historicists often adopt a decentered approach, where to decenter is to show how apparently uniform concepts, traditions, or practices are in fact social constructs that cover and even arise from individuals acting on diverse and changing meanings.

Truth

To conceive of genealogy as an expression of radical historicism is to clarify its epistemic commitments.

Radical historicism is clearly opposed to truth claims that do not recognize their own historicity… From a radical historicist perspective, beliefs and truth-claims are always saturated by the particular tradition against the background of which they are made.

It is impossible to emphasize that an opposition to utter certainties does not entail a denial of all truth claims. To the contrary, radical historicists still can make truth claims provided that they conceive of “truth” not as a kind of timeless certainty but as something more like “objectively valid for us” or “the best account of the world currently on offer”.

Critique

As an expression of radical historicism genealogy operates primarily as a type denaturalizing critique.

Nietzsche and Foucault

Today Nietzsche still appears out of his times in his challenge to developmental historicism.

Foucault’s use of genealogy is complicated by his clear debt to a modernist structuralism.

Conclusion

This essay has argued that genealogy is a mode of knowledge associated with radical historicism.

Arguably, the main advantage of this theory of genealogy is simply that it focuses attention on philosophical issues… Genealogist and other critical historians should not remain content simply to replicate genealogy as a technique of inquiry and narration… [G]enealogists should open themselves up to philosophical innovations and challenges.