An Excerpt: "Systems in Context: On the Outcome of the Habermas/Luhmann-Debate"

Systems in Context: On the Outcome of the Habermas/Luhmann-Debate

by Poul Kjaer, Ancilla Iuris (anci.ch) 2006:66-77

1. Introduction

In the 1970s, much of German social theoretical discourse centered around the debate between Niklas Luhmann and Jurgen Habermas… The central question in this debate was whether the idea of emancipation through rational political steering – the core element in Enlightenment thinking, as well as in German idealism – could still be considered as meaningful. Luhmann argued that it could not. Habermas conversely advocated for a revitalization of Enlightenment ideals and German idealism, to be achieved by development of an ‘updated’ theory of emancipation.

At a first glance, the debate ended with publication of Habermas’ Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns (1981) and Luhmann’s Soziale Systemie (1984).

It is the argument of this article, however, that it remains both possible and fruitful to articulate Habermas’ theoretical ambitions, as they have developed since the publication of Theories des kommunikativen Handelns, using system theoretical tools advanced by Luhmann from the publication of Soziale Systeme onwards.

This article advances eight hypotheses: 1. The central difference between Habermas’ and Luhmann’s theoretical positions is reducible to a difference in assessment of the time-consuming character of social operations. 2. Habermas’ position is based on the concept of lifeworld; but this concept lacks logical coherence. 3. The concept of reiteration, presented by Luhmann as an alternative to the concept of lifeworld, is logically more stringent. 4. Luhmann’s theoretical elaboration nonetheless failed to grasp the importance of context for the constitution of social phenomena, sharply reducing its strength. 5. This shortcoming can be traced to Luhmann’s attempt to de-couple systems theory from the German idealist tradition – which he executed via a sophisticated self-mystification strategy, which sought to present system theory as a new theory, lacking connection to any existing tradition of social thought. Foundational, in constructing this mythology was the concept of paradox. 6. Removing this self-mystifying overlay, the social theoretical toolbox assembled by Luhmann can be used to promote a radically different world-perspective, lacking the kind of skepticism dominating the late Luhmann’s systems theory, and which accords with the German idealist tradition from which systems theory originally emerged. 7. Consequently, Luhmann’s and Habermas’ legal theories can be viewed as owing a common basis in the German idealist tradition, which provides a structural basis for their conversion. 8. Such a conversion allows for an understanding of the two theories as complementary, in so far as the late Habermas’ discourse theory becomes a normative superstructure to Luhmann’s descriptive theory of the society.

2. Time

The difference between Luhmann and Habermas’ theoretical constructions is a difference in time. The central importance of time in Luhmann’s work manifests in his adoption of the mantra in George Spencer Brown’s calculus of indication: “Draw a distinction”. The purpose of introducing such a distinction is to produce a difference, because only a difference between this and that makes possible the observation of this or that. According to Luhmann, the drawing of a distinction is an operation that unfolds in time.

But introducing a distinction is only the first step. An observer also needs to indicate one side of the distinction in order to remain attached to the distinction. So, Luhmann defines observation as the unity of distinction and indication… On the basis of difference between distinction and indication, therefore, Luhmann concludes that distinction-making operations are characterized by structural simultaneousness and operative non-simultaneousness.

This difference between structural simultaneousness and operative non-simultaneousness is central to Luhmann’s attempt to theorize the relationship between systems and their surroundings. But beyond this, it is the central element in the theory of autopoesis which Luhmann presented in Soziale Systeme, and which he later coupled to his version of the calculus of indication… Consequently, it can be concluded, it is not only according to the calculus of indication, but also according to the theory of autopoesis, that social systems should be understood as phenomena operating in their own time.

That systems operate in their own time has far reaching consequences… In other words, any attempt to understand relations between system as causal relations are doomed to fail.

The conceptualization of social phenomena as non-causal runs through Luhmann’s work as a major theme from beginning to end.

In contrast to Luhmann’s emphasis on structural simultaneousness and operative-non-simultaneousness of social operations, Habermas argues that social operations are characterized by structural and operative simultaneousness. Habermas’ approach derives from the notion of inter-subjectivity, which claims “sprach- und handlungsfahigen Subjeckten” are constituted through their relations to other subjects. Consequently, the existence of a plurality of subjects must be regarded as a structural condition… Habermas agues, in other words, that communicative acts can be understood as operations which, without generating time, can establish accordance between two or more subjects’ perspective on the world.

3. Lifeworld

The lifeworld is defined as the context, composed of culturally and linguistically organized patterns of interpretation, within which the “sprach- und handlungsfahige Subjekte” find themselves. It is a common ground… which make it possible for two or more subjects to constitute a common understanding of the world on the basis of an already existing shared interpretation of it.

Nevertheless, the lifeworld cannot just be a ground (Boden), but must be also be a horizon, since the lifeworld is moving ahead at the same pace as the observer. Consequently, the lifeworld must be understood as constituted by the distinction between ground and horizon. According to Luhmann, this concept of lifeworld… is based on a paradox. This is because the lifeworld cannot be the firm ground where all observations and actions are unfolded and, at the same time, an infinite horizon which simply is the WORLD: it cannot be moveable, if it is firm and, if it is firm, it cannot be moveable. Consequently, Luhmann presents an alternative formulation of the problem, replacing the metaphorical concepts of horizon and ground with a distinction between familiarity and non-familiarity. Now familiarity represents the ground, and non-familiarity the horizon, thereby avoiding the contradictions inherent in the misleading opposition between the stationary and the moveable as found in Husserl’s and Habermas’ concepts of lifeworld.

4. Reiteration

In principle… on every occasion one’s indication will be the same. However, though one always indicates the same, the result is never the same! This is because indication leads to condensation of the indicated. Every time an indication is reiterated, the observer obtains an increased feeling of what is being indicated. Reiteration attributes an additional value to the indicated, and it is exactly this value which Luhmann defines as familiarity.

This attribution has radical consequences. According to Luhmann, when one reiterates an operation, once the distinction familiar/unfamiliar has already been established through an earlier operation, then the crossing of a distinction, to indicate the other side, does not cancel indication of the side which one is leaving… Consequently, one can – at any time – embark on a journey into the unknown without giving up the known… We never have to leave the familiar world. It remains our life-world: We never cross the boundary: it remains a horizon that moves as we move. But we know in a familiar way about the unfamiliar.

With this approach, Luhmann presents a logically coherent and operative version of phenomenological concept of lifeworld.

5. Context dependency

Still, it is important to understand that incorporation of Habermas’ notion of lifeworld in the system theoretical universe is not a one-sided undertaking. The concept of lifeworld, to a great extent, is a Trojan horse which, once inside the walls, can trigger a profound shift of focus within system theory itself.

This impression could, however, have been avoided if Luhmann had made the choice to systematically incorporate the system theoretical concept of lifeworld when conducting his empirical investigations.

6. German Idealism

System theory’s lack of focus on the function of context is not an isolated technical problem. On the contrary, it is a fundamental defect that can be traced to Luhmann’s attempt to de-couple systems theory from the German idealist tradition…. According to Kant, it is only possible to think the color red through a simultaneous indication of the phenomena in relation to which the color red stands. A thinking of the color red, therefore, includes a thinking of the frame within which the color red is constituted.

So, whereas Luhmann erases the concept of context from the calculus of indication, thereafter stating that distinctions are typically made within a context and producing a vast number of empirical analyses where the importance of context is downplayed as much as possible, Kant’s work is characterized by greater coherence between the logical foundations and concrete analysis of social phenomena.

7. Paradox

He argues, his theory is founded on the paradox which results from his concept of observation… One can, therefore, distinguish between a first order observer who focuses on what is observed, and a second order observer who observes how the first order observer observes. The second order observer can see what the first order observer cannot – the first order observer’s observation. Yet this does not give the second order observer a privileged position, since she cannot observe her own observation either. The second order observer is therefore a first order observer herself when she is being observed by another third order observer.

Since Luhmann defines a paradox as the unity of different things, he is entitled to conclude that the true basis of systems theory is paradox, not identity.

Hence, in denying the concept of identity as the basic concept of systems theory, the Luhmann of the late 1980s and 1990s abandoned not only identity, but also the concept of distinction as well. The later Luhmann, in other words, exceeds the distinction between distinction and identity, in order to base his theory on paradox.

8. Meaning

Luhmann claims that a concept of world is too general to serve as a basis for any profound analysis of social phenomena… Luhmann instead emphasizes the concept of meaning (Sinn): “we will certainly need a medium that is the same on both sides of the frame, on its inside and on its outside. I propose to call this medium meaning”. The latter concept, according to Luhmann, is “coextensive with the world”… Luhmann’s rationale for avoiding the notion of world must therefore lie elsewhere… The main purpose of distinguishing the concepts of world and meaning, in other words, is to avoid associations with the Story of the Creation and other acts of initiation.

More concretely, the function of the concept of meaning in Luhmann is to achieve de-paradoxialization through a neutralization of the asymmetry he was earlier forced to introduce into the calculus of indication, in order to make it an operational social theoretical tool…

The concept of meaning, therefore, remains irreplaceable but also crucial to the theory’s overall viability. While this, in principle, was recognized by the late Luhmann, he never transformed the concept of meaning into a useable tool for describing social phenomena. Instead, it was retained as a general background notion, encompassing everything and therefore signifying nothing.

9. Self-mystification

Luhmann developed a sophisticated self-mystification strategy, devising a highly imaginative terminology to go with it. Indeed, so successful was he in this strategy, that many present day system theoreticians appear to believe that Luhmann himself was responsible for the basic concepts of the systems theory. Consequently, many theoreticians also believe that systems theory is not embedded in any existing tradition -  a problematic view, given that most system theoretical concepts derive almost directly from German idealism.

Failure to acknowledge this heritage is becoming a major threat to the systems theory’s future utility as a tool for social theoretical analysis. This is because, firstly, it has the consequence that many of Luhmann’s disciples are only capable of defending systems theory from within, whereas they require a language bestowing a capacity to argue outside its own frame; secondly, because it provides a structural basis for theoretical fundamentalism, visible, for example, in the attempt to elevate the calculus of indication to a position where it supplies the basis of all other system  theoretical concepts. Electing such a strategy for further theoretical development, however, undermines one of the strongest elements of system theory – namely, the stability its non-reductionist version possesses as a system, precisely because it is not based on any one element but on a whole range.

On an alternative view systems theory represents a further development of the German idealist tradition of Kant, Fichte and Hegel to Husserl… In contrast to earlier forms, systems theory is an explicitly post-ontological theory.

This genealogical endeavor would allow the theory’s liberation from its own self-mystifying semantics without total rejection. Then, Luhmann’s rich social theoretical toolbox can be reopened and its contents applied to promote perspectives on society other than the variety of societal skepticism advocated by the late Luhmann.

10. Convergence

If systems theory is “opened up”, as described above, it becomes more compatible with other theories, and especially with the theoretical complex resulting from Habermas’ reconstruction and renewal of German idealist insights.

The move away from a discourse ethics, and to a discourse theory (by Habermas), in other words, points towards replacement of the “old-European” striving for totality on the basis of a concept of morality, with a functional and pragmatic approach, seeking to develop and deploy tools that can ensure a continued coordination of the ongoing reproduction of autonomous social systems. Consequently, the design of mechanisms enabling such coordination is reduced to the legal task of developing relevant procedural rules and safeguards.

Such an undertaking can be supported by insights contained in the system theoretical concepts of morality and critique.

Luhmann’s concept of morality makes it possible to question his claim that the system theoretical concepts of lifeworld and meaning do not provide a basis for critique of modern society… Luhmann himself also provides concept that can be applied to achieve objectives set by Habermas.

11. Conclusion

None of Luhmann’s “translations” of Habermasian concepts… are effectively deployed. Yet, these concepts need to be applied, and need to achieve a fundamentally different status within systems theory, since they could solve a number of its central flaws.

In sum, one outcome of the Habermas/Luhmann debate is that the late Habermas’ discourse theory can be regarded as a normative superstructure to Luhmann’s descriptive theory of society. But a second is that, beyond the tendency to the two theoretical complexes’ convergence, a complete fusion, through the development of a fully fledged “inter-systemic” and “critical” systems theory, could provide a viable basis for further theoretical development. Such a theory might provide an optimal frame for the continuing reformulation of legal theory.