An Excerpt: "Naturalistic Approaches to Social Construction" from Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

If there is any core idea of social constructionism, it is that some object or objects are caused or controlled by social or cultural factors rather than natural factors, and if there is any core motivation of such research, it is the aim of showing that such objects are or were under our control: they could be, or might have been, otherwise.

Social constructionist themes can be and have been picked up by naturalists who accommodate and appropriate the interesting and important cultural phenomena documented by constructionist authors while sidestepping more radical anti-scientific and anti-realist theses widely associated with social constructionism.

1. What is Social Construction?

Y is socially constructed.

X socially constructs Y.

1.1 What Constructs?

Many of the agents in social constructionist claims can be neatly divided into two groups: those that view the agents as primarily impersonal agents, and those that view the agents as personal agents (i.e., persons or groups).

Work in the first group emphasizes a causal role for impersonal causes like cultures, conventions, or institutions in producing some phenomenon.

A second group of constructionist claims emphasizes personal social agents that construct through their choices… Other constructionists—those we might call critical constructionists—emphasize personal choices not just to establish the contingency of the acceptance of some representation as to emphasize the role of an agent’s interests or power relations in determining the content of an accepted representation.

1.2 What is constructed?

Most uses of “construction”-talk… are directed at three very different sorts of entities: representations (e.g. ideas, theories, concepts, accounts, taxonomies, and so forth), (non-representational) facts quite generally, and a special sort of non-representational fact: facts about human traits.

It is useful to first distinguish global constructionist claims that hold that every fact is a social construction, from local constructionist claims that hold that only particular facts are.

1.3 What is it to Construct?

We can distinguish two importantly different sorts of relationship: causal or constitutive.

The first, and more straightforward idea is causal construction: X causally constructs Y if and only if X causes Y to exist or to persist or X controls the kind-typical properties of Y.

More obscure is the idea that X’s construction of Y is some sort of constitutive relationship. X constitutively constructs Y if and only if X’s conceptual or social activity regarding an individual y is metaphysically necessary for y to be a Y.

There is a different model of necessity for the constructionist, however, which is to hold that the necessity in question is revealed a posteriori by our investigations of the phenomenon in question.

Of course, there may well be other models of necessity available. For example, it is sometimes suggested that a neo-Kantian interpretation of social constructionism is possible, an interpretation on which our socio-linguistic activities could provide a transcendental basis for any knowledge of the world.

2. Naturalism and Social Construction

Above, we identified naturalism with a certain attitude towards science, and for present purpose, we develop this idea by identifying three naturalistic attitudes toward science that have been picked up by naturalists addressing social constructionist themes.

Epistemological Fundamentalism
Metaphysical Fundamentalism
Human Naturalism

These features characterize substantial threads of contemporary naturalist though—threads that arise repeatedly in discussions of constructionism.

3. Naturalizing Social Construction

3.1. The Social Construction of Representations

A number of commentators have noted that many provocative constructionist claims are, in the first instance, claims that some sort of representation is constructed…. Where we limit the objects of constructionist claims to representations (such as theories), the claims cease to be particularly metaphysically provocative though detailed constructionist accounts of how certain representations came to be selected may still teach us much about science.

Still some constructionists endorse a stronger claim as well—that in constructing the theories, the facts described by those theories are thereby made to be… The distinctive feature of social constructionist explanations of representation is that they explain how we came to have those representations not by reference to the facts in the world they represent (as in realism), nor by reference to associations among our sensations (as in some forms of empiricism), nor by reference to innate knowledge or concepts (as in rationalism), nor by reference to the conditions of our thought or experience (as in transcendental arguments) but rather by reference to social and cultural background facts.

In contrast to naturalistic response to the threat of scientific anti-realism, naturalistic responses to constructionist claims about representations (including beliefs) understood as human traits have been far more sympathetic to constructionist approaches… In contemporary naturalistic philosophy of science and psychology, the naturalistic explanation of culturally produced cognition is picked up by at least three distinct strands of work taking up constructionist themes of culture. The first is centered on the idea that culture can be understood by analogy with population genetics, and that cultural items might be understood to be more or less successful based upon their success in spreading in a population.

The second, overlapping strand of naturalistic inquiry also views culture as a system of representations upon which selection acts, but attempts to integrate this idea with the idea, common in evolutionary cognitive psychology, that the mind is comprised of a great many domain-specific mental mechanisms, and uses these as the selective mechanisms that act as a primary mechanism of selection.

A third, philosophically undeveloped strand naturalizes crucial elements of critical constructionist approaches by suggesting the influence of sometimes implicit evaluations on judgments and theoretical activities.

3.2 Construction, Human Kinds and Human Traits

Since the constructionist strategy explains a trait by appeal to highly contingent factors (including culture), partisans of these debates often come inquire whether a trait or cluster of traits is culturally specific, or can be found across cultures.

3.2.1 The Conceptual Project

This conceptual project is a philosophical project par excellence, and it has contributed a great deal to clarifying just what conceptual and empirical issues are at stake in constructionist work.

3.2.2 The Social Role Project

Such a causal model of the way in which social roles might shape behavior is at least arguably naturalistic in all of the above senses.

Insofar as these and similar processes prove to be important and pervasive, they may provide an account of underlying psychological mechanisms in virtue of which constructionist claims about human kinds might be true.

4. New Directions for Social Construction

4.1 Constructionist Explanation and Integrative Models

It is now common, especially among those sympathetic to evolutionary and nativist approaches to human psychology, to call for very general, integrative approaches that combine acknowledgement of a role for evolutionary forces in shaping human nature with a complimentary respect for the role of social constructionist mechanisms in producing human traits and their products.

4.2 Social Construction as Ultimate Explanation

The canonical way to understand social constructionism about human traits is as suggesting that human traits emerge from experience of the world and as emphasizing the role of culture in structuring the world so experienced. Such constructionism thus contrasts with nativist accounts of those traits.

Recent work suggests the possibility that culture might provide relatively more ultimate explanations of some evolved traits.

In a different vein, recent work on niche construction—the process by which organisms successfully modify their environments in ways that benefit themselves and their offspring—has also suggests a role for culture in altering natural selection… the niches may also be more or less structured by our cultural conceptions, including our conceptions of different kinds of person.

Such a hypothesis combines Kitcher’s suggestion of the biological significance of intracultural reproductive isolation that socially constructed racial classification may produce with the niche selectionist idea that culture may produce selective pressures resulting in biological adaptation.

5. Conclusion

Philosophical naturalists as well as working scientists have begun to take up this opportunity in ways that use the methods of philosophy and science to both state and evaluate social constructionist hypotheses (though not always under that label). Because of the powerful and central role culture plays in shaping human social environments, behaviors, identities and development, there is ample room for continuing and even expanding the pursuit of social constructionist themes within a naturalistic framework.

An Except: "Hermeneutics" from Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

1. Introduction

The beginning of ancient hermeneutics as a more systematic activity goes back to the exegesis of the Homeric epics. The most remarkable characteristic of ancient exegesis was allegorisis. This was a method of nonliteral interpretation of the authoritative texts which contained claims and statements that seemed theologically and morally inappropriate or false. Such exegetical attempts were aiming at a deeper sense, hidden under the surface—hyponoia, i.e., underlying meaning… In the Middle Ages the most remarkable characteristic of the interpretative praxis was the so-called accessus ad auctores; this was a standardized introduction that preceded the editions and commentaries of (classical) authors.

Johann Conrad Dannhauer was the first to present a systematic textbook on general hermeneutics, the Idea boni interpretis et malitiosi calumniatoris (1630) introducing the Latin neologism hermeneutica as the title of a general modus sciendi… A series of authors followed the lead of Dannhauer who established the systematic locus of hermeneutics within logic. Most remarkable is the work of Johann Clauberg (1654), who introduced sophisticated distinctions between the rules of interpretation with respect to their generality and clarified the capturing of the intention of the author as a valuable aim of interpretative praxis.

The scope of the more recent discussion son interpretation has become broader, often starting with the question whether human actions are to be viewed as physical phenomena or not and how they should be treated. Naturalists since Mill, have contended that actions have to be viewed as phenomena on a continuum with other phenomena in nature, and that they should be studied accordingly. Issues of interpretation hardly emerge if one adopts such a view. Interpretivists like Dilthey, on the contrary, have argued forcefully that human actions cannot be viewed as natural phenomena since their meaningfulness makes them categorically distinct… The disagreement concerns the issue as to whether it is constitutive for a human action to have meaning or not. If one adopts the interpretivist view, then issues of interpretation necessarily arise in the space of the mental. Human actions are meaningful, and the outcomes of these actions constitute meaningful material which calls for interpretation.

It is important to distinguish carefully between two levels of analysis, the ontological and the epistemological. Heidegger has proposed a hermeneutic phenomenology as a Hermeneutik der Faktizitat that should replace traditional ontology: its centerpiece being an existential analytic of Dasein, i.e., human existence… Gadamer partly adopted this view of ontology, so that the so-called philosophical hermeneutics emerged as a philosophical program largely based on the work of these two protagoists. Although epistemological studies on hermeneutics can, they need not share these or any other commitments with respect to ontology. Epistemological approaches, either descriptive or normative, can start with problems of interpretation and propose solutions to the problems independently of the ontological constitution and structure that underlies each problem area.

In fact, the age-old “Verstehen vs. Erklaren” debate is largely about this question: whether there is a distinct method for the apprehension of meaningful material, employable in the social sciences and the humanities (Geisteswissenschaften; Kulturwissenschaften), which deal with such material, i.e., Verstehen (understanding), or whether the general method employed in the natural sciences is successfully employable in the social sciences and humanities as well, i.e., Erklaren (explanation). Methodological dualist like Dilthey famously pleaded for the autonomy of the social sciences and humanities which must follow the method of Verstehen.

By contrast to this dualistic approach, methodological monists like Mill reject the dichotomy and plead for a single method applicable to all sciences, convinced as he is that discovering and establishing lawlike hypotheses is also possible in the social sciences and humanities. At the heart of this controversy lies a question about the acceptance of what can be called “the method-object-argument”, i.e., the position that the scientific method has to be suited to its object… The argument postulates the primacy of the object of inquiry over the method of inquiry.

In any case, the ontological and epistemological levels are not consistently segregated in the discussion.

2. The Hermeneutic Circle

The Hermeneutic circle is a prominent and recurring theme in the discussion ever since the philologist Friedrich Ast… drew attention to the circularity of interpretation: “The foundational law of all understanding and knowledge”, he claimed, is “to find the spirit of the whole through the individual, and through the whole to grasp the individual”.

Many philosophers follow the lead of Heidegger who conceptualizes the hermeneutical circle as an ontological issue.

This conceptualization has been severely criticized as a fruitless attempt to immunize his conception from criticism by deliberately sheltering it under a mantle of apriorism.

Others view the hermeneutic circle as a logical or methodological problem. To begin with, it is clear that the hermeneutic circle is not a logical problem in a strict sense… Stegmuller contends that the hermeneutic circle constitutes a dilemma of a methodological nature… Follesdal, Walloe and Elster also hold that the hermeneutic circle is a methodological problem.

Instead of viewing the hermeneutic circle as a methodological problem that emerges when testing an interpretative hypothesis, one can take it that the problem of the relationship between the meaningful whole and its elements emerges in the process of formulating a hypothesis… There is enough evidence that supports the claim that the discourse on the hermeneutic circle can be appropriately viewed as the search process that is activated if the interpreter of a linguistic expression does not understand something immediately.

3. Text Interpretation

It is prima facie plausible to postulate that there is nothing beyond understanding a text, than understanding the sentences which compose it; and that there is nothing beyond understanding a sentence than understanding the words which compose it. This widespread view is based on the belief in the validity of the principle of compositionality: the meaning of a complex expression is supposed to be fully determined by its structure and the meaning of its constituents.

However, a standard philosophical critique questions the possibility of providing testable models of text comprehension without appropriately acknowledging the normative presuppositions underlying all interpretative praxis. There are two lines of argument that have been influential in this context. The first has been propagated most emphatically in the Anglo-Saxon philosophical discussion of the second half of the twentieth century with respect to what is known as “radical interpretation”.

It is important to stress that the principle of hermeneutic equity is explicitly formulated as a presumption: a rule which can fail to stand up to evidence. In the Anglo-Saxon discussion on radical interpretation referred to above, the general thrust of the argument is that these rules are constitutive for the practice of interpretation; they occupy a specific status that must accordingly be recognized as an important presupposition of all interpretation. However, their apparent indispensability can simply be traced to the fact that they have been particularly well corroborated, as they have often been employed with success. Accordingly, it is only their greater corroboration that leads to a presumption that they are indispensable to every interpretation.

The second line of argument regarding the normative presuppositions of interpretative praxis, centers around the indispensability of a rationality assumption in all interpretation. According to this argument, it is possible to apprehend linguistic expressions only if it is assumed that speakers or authors manifest complex features that are appropriately conceptualized as rational… So, according to this view, rationality is constitutive of the beliefs of the author which give rise to his or her linguistic expressions and, thus, rationality is a (or the) normative presupposition which must underlie all interpretative praxis. However, the rationality assumption is surely not an uncontested principle, and many questions regarding whether rationality is indeed constitutive and how much rationality is necessary if (successful) interpretation is to take place remain.

Thus, the process of text interpretation which lies in the center of hermeneutics as the methodological discipline dealing with interpretation can and has been analyzed empirically with the help of testable models. The question whether there are certain normative presuppositions of the interpretative praxis… is a focal issue of obvious philosophical importance. Regardless of the position that is assumed with respect to this issue, it is hardly possible to deny that the interpretative praxis can take on multiple forms and can take place according to diverse aims.

4. Aims of Text Interpretation

Text interpretation as a goal-directed activity can assume different forms, but must be distinguished from highlighting the significance of a text. In fact, a series of serious misunderstandings and confusions can be easily avoided, if a clear distinction is made between interpretation as an activity directed at the appropriation of the meaning of a text and textual criticism as an activity that is concerned with the significance of a text with respect to different values.

It is indisputable that interpretation can be directed at many different goals. For a long time the discussion has centered around the appropriate objective of interpretation and a focal point has been the so-called intentional fallacy… The crux of the matter in the debate has been whether grasping the intention of the author of a text is the only aim of interpretation or not and assuming that authorial intention is indeed the goal of interpretation, how exactly it can be tracked.

Besides Quentin Skinner, Axel Buhler, among others, has contended that it is possible to identify the author’s intentions… and that it is even possible to specify the communicative intention of the author in fictional texts… This position, broadly known as Hermeneutic Intentionalism, provides arguments designed to show that capturing the intention of the author is perfectly desirable and fully accessible as an aim of interpretation and that the intentional fallacy is not a fallacy at all.

Whereas the notion of intention is certainly useful in providing a methodological account of interpretation, its use is surely part of a later development; and it has been largely imported into hermeneutic methodology from discussions in philosophy of mind and language that took place in the analytic tradition in the 20^th century. It was itself a reaction against two orthodoxies prevailing at the time. On the one hand, that interpretation should aim only at the concrete text itself; and on the other, that interpretation should aim at the social context which gave rise (or caused) the creation of the concrete text.

The term “nexus of meaning” (Sinnzusammenhang) used by Dilthey and others in the tradition of classical hermeneutics is, however, more appropriate as a terminus technicus than the notion of intention… Text interpretation can be conceptualized as the activity directed at correctly identifying the meaning of a text by virtue of accurately reconstructing the nexus of meaning that has arisen in connection with that text.

The notion of the nexus of meaning is central for the methodology of hermeneutics, mainly because it can accommodate the hermeneutic practices of a series of disciplines… It is obvious, then, that interpretation in the hermeneutic tradition is conceptualized as a process of reconstructing nexuses of meaning and represents a process diametrically opposite to the process of deconstruction as proposed for example by Derrida and his followers.

Viewing interpretation as a process of reconstructing the nexus of meaning of a text does pay due attention to the context of the text, without assuming that the social and historical context had caused the production of the text… We have seen that it has long been an object of fierce dispute whether capturing the intention of the author is the only legitimate objective of an interpretation or not. However, this dispute can be successfully arbitrated if one bears in mind the character of hermeneutics as a technical discipline… In other words, one only needs to accept an aim of interpretation hypothetically, and then inquire into the ways that it can be accomplished. Such a technology operates with hypothetical rather than categorical imperatives.

5. The Hypothetico-Deductive Method

The application of the hypothetico-deductive method is a way to show that the standards currently used when dealing with problems of explanation—intersubjective intelligibility, testability with the use of evidence, rational argumentation and objectivity—can also apply to problems of interpretation. It will be very briefly shown how this method can be applied in five steps.

In order to reconstruct the nexus of meaning which is connected with a specific text, interpretative hypotheses need be established as a first step… In such cases one can, in a second step, deduce from such interpretative hypotheses, in conjunction with other statements, consequences which could be more observable, that is, consequences that could be (more easily) testable. In a third step, these observable consequences can be tested with the help of evidence primarily provided with the help of research techniques from the social sciences and humanities… In a fourth step, the different interpretative hypotheses are checked against the evidence. A comparative evaluation is necessary here, in order to distinguish good from bad interpretations… In the fifth step of the application of the hypothetico-deductive method, a multi-dimensional evaluation of the same interpretative hypothesis with respect to different values or of a set of hypotheses with respect to one value is possible… Our fallible judgments are all what we have here as elsewhere and enabling a critical discussion is the prerequisite of making informed choices.

In conclusion, the hypothetico-deductive method can help establish hermeneutic objectivity, ultimately based on a critical discussion among the participants to the discourse on the appropriateness of different interpretations regarding the fulfillment of the diverse aims of interpretation. Intersubjective intelligibility, testability with the use of evidence, rational argumentation and objectivity are, thus, feasible also in the case of text interpretation.

6. Epilogue

Hermeneutics as the methodology of interpretation can provide guidance for solving problems of interpretation of human actions, texts and other meaningful material by offering a toolbox based on solid empirical evidence.

An Excerpt: "Systems in Context: On the Outcome of the Habermas/Luhmann-Debate"

Systems in Context: On the Outcome of the Habermas/Luhmann-Debate

by Poul Kjaer, Ancilla Iuris (anci.ch) 2006:66-77

1. Introduction

In the 1970s, much of German social theoretical discourse centered around the debate between Niklas Luhmann and Jurgen Habermas… The central question in this debate was whether the idea of emancipation through rational political steering – the core element in Enlightenment thinking, as well as in German idealism – could still be considered as meaningful. Luhmann argued that it could not. Habermas conversely advocated for a revitalization of Enlightenment ideals and German idealism, to be achieved by development of an ‘updated’ theory of emancipation.

At a first glance, the debate ended with publication of Habermas’ Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns (1981) and Luhmann’s Soziale Systemie (1984).

It is the argument of this article, however, that it remains both possible and fruitful to articulate Habermas’ theoretical ambitions, as they have developed since the publication of Theories des kommunikativen Handelns, using system theoretical tools advanced by Luhmann from the publication of Soziale Systeme onwards.

This article advances eight hypotheses: 1. The central difference between Habermas’ and Luhmann’s theoretical positions is reducible to a difference in assessment of the time-consuming character of social operations. 2. Habermas’ position is based on the concept of lifeworld; but this concept lacks logical coherence. 3. The concept of reiteration, presented by Luhmann as an alternative to the concept of lifeworld, is logically more stringent. 4. Luhmann’s theoretical elaboration nonetheless failed to grasp the importance of context for the constitution of social phenomena, sharply reducing its strength. 5. This shortcoming can be traced to Luhmann’s attempt to de-couple systems theory from the German idealist tradition – which he executed via a sophisticated self-mystification strategy, which sought to present system theory as a new theory, lacking connection to any existing tradition of social thought. Foundational, in constructing this mythology was the concept of paradox. 6. Removing this self-mystifying overlay, the social theoretical toolbox assembled by Luhmann can be used to promote a radically different world-perspective, lacking the kind of skepticism dominating the late Luhmann’s systems theory, and which accords with the German idealist tradition from which systems theory originally emerged. 7. Consequently, Luhmann’s and Habermas’ legal theories can be viewed as owing a common basis in the German idealist tradition, which provides a structural basis for their conversion. 8. Such a conversion allows for an understanding of the two theories as complementary, in so far as the late Habermas’ discourse theory becomes a normative superstructure to Luhmann’s descriptive theory of the society.

2. Time

The difference between Luhmann and Habermas’ theoretical constructions is a difference in time. The central importance of time in Luhmann’s work manifests in his adoption of the mantra in George Spencer Brown’s calculus of indication: “Draw a distinction”. The purpose of introducing such a distinction is to produce a difference, because only a difference between this and that makes possible the observation of this or that. According to Luhmann, the drawing of a distinction is an operation that unfolds in time.

But introducing a distinction is only the first step. An observer also needs to indicate one side of the distinction in order to remain attached to the distinction. So, Luhmann defines observation as the unity of distinction and indication… On the basis of difference between distinction and indication, therefore, Luhmann concludes that distinction-making operations are characterized by structural simultaneousness and operative non-simultaneousness.

This difference between structural simultaneousness and operative non-simultaneousness is central to Luhmann’s attempt to theorize the relationship between systems and their surroundings. But beyond this, it is the central element in the theory of autopoesis which Luhmann presented in Soziale Systeme, and which he later coupled to his version of the calculus of indication… Consequently, it can be concluded, it is not only according to the calculus of indication, but also according to the theory of autopoesis, that social systems should be understood as phenomena operating in their own time.

That systems operate in their own time has far reaching consequences… In other words, any attempt to understand relations between system as causal relations are doomed to fail.

The conceptualization of social phenomena as non-causal runs through Luhmann’s work as a major theme from beginning to end.

In contrast to Luhmann’s emphasis on structural simultaneousness and operative-non-simultaneousness of social operations, Habermas argues that social operations are characterized by structural and operative simultaneousness. Habermas’ approach derives from the notion of inter-subjectivity, which claims “sprach- und handlungsfahigen Subjeckten” are constituted through their relations to other subjects. Consequently, the existence of a plurality of subjects must be regarded as a structural condition… Habermas agues, in other words, that communicative acts can be understood as operations which, without generating time, can establish accordance between two or more subjects’ perspective on the world.

3. Lifeworld

The lifeworld is defined as the context, composed of culturally and linguistically organized patterns of interpretation, within which the “sprach- und handlungsfahige Subjekte” find themselves. It is a common ground… which make it possible for two or more subjects to constitute a common understanding of the world on the basis of an already existing shared interpretation of it.

Nevertheless, the lifeworld cannot just be a ground (Boden), but must be also be a horizon, since the lifeworld is moving ahead at the same pace as the observer. Consequently, the lifeworld must be understood as constituted by the distinction between ground and horizon. According to Luhmann, this concept of lifeworld… is based on a paradox. This is because the lifeworld cannot be the firm ground where all observations and actions are unfolded and, at the same time, an infinite horizon which simply is the WORLD: it cannot be moveable, if it is firm and, if it is firm, it cannot be moveable. Consequently, Luhmann presents an alternative formulation of the problem, replacing the metaphorical concepts of horizon and ground with a distinction between familiarity and non-familiarity. Now familiarity represents the ground, and non-familiarity the horizon, thereby avoiding the contradictions inherent in the misleading opposition between the stationary and the moveable as found in Husserl’s and Habermas’ concepts of lifeworld.

4. Reiteration

In principle… on every occasion one’s indication will be the same. However, though one always indicates the same, the result is never the same! This is because indication leads to condensation of the indicated. Every time an indication is reiterated, the observer obtains an increased feeling of what is being indicated. Reiteration attributes an additional value to the indicated, and it is exactly this value which Luhmann defines as familiarity.

This attribution has radical consequences. According to Luhmann, when one reiterates an operation, once the distinction familiar/unfamiliar has already been established through an earlier operation, then the crossing of a distinction, to indicate the other side, does not cancel indication of the side which one is leaving… Consequently, one can – at any time – embark on a journey into the unknown without giving up the known… We never have to leave the familiar world. It remains our life-world: We never cross the boundary: it remains a horizon that moves as we move. But we know in a familiar way about the unfamiliar.

With this approach, Luhmann presents a logically coherent and operative version of phenomenological concept of lifeworld.

5. Context dependency

Still, it is important to understand that incorporation of Habermas’ notion of lifeworld in the system theoretical universe is not a one-sided undertaking. The concept of lifeworld, to a great extent, is a Trojan horse which, once inside the walls, can trigger a profound shift of focus within system theory itself.

This impression could, however, have been avoided if Luhmann had made the choice to systematically incorporate the system theoretical concept of lifeworld when conducting his empirical investigations.

6. German Idealism

System theory’s lack of focus on the function of context is not an isolated technical problem. On the contrary, it is a fundamental defect that can be traced to Luhmann’s attempt to de-couple systems theory from the German idealist tradition…. According to Kant, it is only possible to think the color red through a simultaneous indication of the phenomena in relation to which the color red stands. A thinking of the color red, therefore, includes a thinking of the frame within which the color red is constituted.

So, whereas Luhmann erases the concept of context from the calculus of indication, thereafter stating that distinctions are typically made within a context and producing a vast number of empirical analyses where the importance of context is downplayed as much as possible, Kant’s work is characterized by greater coherence between the logical foundations and concrete analysis of social phenomena.

7. Paradox

He argues, his theory is founded on the paradox which results from his concept of observation… One can, therefore, distinguish between a first order observer who focuses on what is observed, and a second order observer who observes how the first order observer observes. The second order observer can see what the first order observer cannot – the first order observer’s observation. Yet this does not give the second order observer a privileged position, since she cannot observe her own observation either. The second order observer is therefore a first order observer herself when she is being observed by another third order observer.

Since Luhmann defines a paradox as the unity of different things, he is entitled to conclude that the true basis of systems theory is paradox, not identity.

Hence, in denying the concept of identity as the basic concept of systems theory, the Luhmann of the late 1980s and 1990s abandoned not only identity, but also the concept of distinction as well. The later Luhmann, in other words, exceeds the distinction between distinction and identity, in order to base his theory on paradox.

8. Meaning

Luhmann claims that a concept of world is too general to serve as a basis for any profound analysis of social phenomena… Luhmann instead emphasizes the concept of meaning (Sinn): “we will certainly need a medium that is the same on both sides of the frame, on its inside and on its outside. I propose to call this medium meaning”. The latter concept, according to Luhmann, is “coextensive with the world”… Luhmann’s rationale for avoiding the notion of world must therefore lie elsewhere… The main purpose of distinguishing the concepts of world and meaning, in other words, is to avoid associations with the Story of the Creation and other acts of initiation.

More concretely, the function of the concept of meaning in Luhmann is to achieve de-paradoxialization through a neutralization of the asymmetry he was earlier forced to introduce into the calculus of indication, in order to make it an operational social theoretical tool…

The concept of meaning, therefore, remains irreplaceable but also crucial to the theory’s overall viability. While this, in principle, was recognized by the late Luhmann, he never transformed the concept of meaning into a useable tool for describing social phenomena. Instead, it was retained as a general background notion, encompassing everything and therefore signifying nothing.

9. Self-mystification

Luhmann developed a sophisticated self-mystification strategy, devising a highly imaginative terminology to go with it. Indeed, so successful was he in this strategy, that many present day system theoreticians appear to believe that Luhmann himself was responsible for the basic concepts of the systems theory. Consequently, many theoreticians also believe that systems theory is not embedded in any existing tradition -  a problematic view, given that most system theoretical concepts derive almost directly from German idealism.

Failure to acknowledge this heritage is becoming a major threat to the systems theory’s future utility as a tool for social theoretical analysis. This is because, firstly, it has the consequence that many of Luhmann’s disciples are only capable of defending systems theory from within, whereas they require a language bestowing a capacity to argue outside its own frame; secondly, because it provides a structural basis for theoretical fundamentalism, visible, for example, in the attempt to elevate the calculus of indication to a position where it supplies the basis of all other system  theoretical concepts. Electing such a strategy for further theoretical development, however, undermines one of the strongest elements of system theory – namely, the stability its non-reductionist version possesses as a system, precisely because it is not based on any one element but on a whole range.

On an alternative view systems theory represents a further development of the German idealist tradition of Kant, Fichte and Hegel to Husserl… In contrast to earlier forms, systems theory is an explicitly post-ontological theory.

This genealogical endeavor would allow the theory’s liberation from its own self-mystifying semantics without total rejection. Then, Luhmann’s rich social theoretical toolbox can be reopened and its contents applied to promote perspectives on society other than the variety of societal skepticism advocated by the late Luhmann.

10. Convergence

If systems theory is “opened up”, as described above, it becomes more compatible with other theories, and especially with the theoretical complex resulting from Habermas’ reconstruction and renewal of German idealist insights.

The move away from a discourse ethics, and to a discourse theory (by Habermas), in other words, points towards replacement of the “old-European” striving for totality on the basis of a concept of morality, with a functional and pragmatic approach, seeking to develop and deploy tools that can ensure a continued coordination of the ongoing reproduction of autonomous social systems. Consequently, the design of mechanisms enabling such coordination is reduced to the legal task of developing relevant procedural rules and safeguards.

Such an undertaking can be supported by insights contained in the system theoretical concepts of morality and critique.

Luhmann’s concept of morality makes it possible to question his claim that the system theoretical concepts of lifeworld and meaning do not provide a basis for critique of modern society… Luhmann himself also provides concept that can be applied to achieve objectives set by Habermas.

11. Conclusion

None of Luhmann’s “translations” of Habermasian concepts… are effectively deployed. Yet, these concepts need to be applied, and need to achieve a fundamentally different status within systems theory, since they could solve a number of its central flaws.

In sum, one outcome of the Habermas/Luhmann debate is that the late Habermas’ discourse theory can be regarded as a normative superstructure to Luhmann’s descriptive theory of society. But a second is that, beyond the tendency to the two theoretical complexes’ convergence, a complete fusion, through the development of a fully fledged “inter-systemic” and “critical” systems theory, could provide a viable basis for further theoretical development. Such a theory might provide an optimal frame for the continuing reformulation of legal theory. 

타인의 얼굴: 레비나스의 철학 (강영안, 문학과 지성사, 2005) 중 3장 존재, 주체, 타자: [존재에서 존재자로] [시간과 타자]를 통해 본 레비나스의 초기 철학 발췌요약

레비나스의 현상학적 서술에서 주체 출현을 드러내는 과정을 초기 철학을 중심으로 살펴 볼 것이다. 여기서 중요한 것은 어떻게 익명적 존재에서 주체로, 다시 주체에서 타자로의 이행이 발생하는가를 밝히는 것이다. 이 이행을 일컬어 레비나스는 ‘존재론적 모험’이라 부른다. 다른 말로 하자면 ‘초월’이다.

진정한 삶의 부재로부터 ‘형이상학적 욕망’이 발생하고, 인간의 삶과 철학은 진정한 삶을 향한 부단히 넘어감, 곧 초월임을 레비나스는 지적한다.

초월을 기술하기 위해 레비나스는 ‘전체성과 무한’ ‘동일자 (자기)와 타자’ ‘통일성과 다원성’ ‘내재성과 외재성’ ‘내재와 초월’ ‘존재와 존재와 다른 것’ ‘존재론과 형이상학’ 등 일련의 대립된 낱말짝을 사용한다… 레비나스는 “형이상학은 존재론에 선행한다”는 논제를 내세운다. 파르메니데스부터 하이데거에 이르기까지 서양 철학은 ‘동일자에 의한 타자의 흡수’를 겨냥하는 ‘존재론’이었다고 보고 이것을 지양할 수 있는 ‘타자의 형이상학’이 존재론에 대해 우위성을 점해야 한다고 주장한다… 레비나스는 전통적인 주체 개념을 철저히 해체한다. 하지만 레비나스는 누구보다 강하게 ‘주체성’을 변호한다. 이 점에서 포스트모더니스트들과 구별된다.

1. 존재론적 분리와 익명적 존재

레비나스의 존재론은 하이데거의 존재론, 특히 ‘존재’와 ‘존재자’의 구별을 뜻하는 ‘존재론적 차이’를 전제한다. 레비나스는 존재와 존재자의 구별은 하이데거 철학의 가장 심오한 요소이며 이 구별이 자신의 철학의 출발점이 되었다고 고백한다.

그러나 그의 존재 개념은 하이데거와 다르다. 레비나스에 따르면 존재는 빛이나 밝음보다는 무거움과 어두움으로 체험된다. 인간이 갖는 불안은 ‘무에 대한 불안’이 아니라 ‘존재에 대한 불안’이다… 존재는 그것이 지닌 익명성과 어두움, 인간에게 주는 공포 때문에 문제가 된다. 인간은 존재로부터 도피 또는 탈출하고자 부단히 시도한다… 존재는 하이데거에서 보듯이 줌 또는 은사나 혜택이 아니라 무거움과 공포를 체험하는 대상이다. 공포의 대상으로서 존재함을 레비나스는 ‘존재자 없는 존재’란 이름으로 다룬다.

레비나스는 존재의 근원적, 일차적 의미를 ‘존재자 없는 존재’를 통해 드러내 보인다.

어떤 것이 아니면서, 그렇다고 무엇이라 말할 수 없는 ‘무’를 우리는 어디서 경험할 수 있는가? 레비나스는 밤의 경험을 그 예로 든다… ‘존재’에 이르는 또 다른 통로로 레비나스는 불면의 경험을 든다.

‘존재’는 주체가 없는 존재이며 그 자신으로 존재하는 인격이 그곳에는 존재하지 않는다. 자신을 향해 ‘나’라고 부를 수 있는 존재자의 부재는 레비나스가 말하는 ‘존재 사건’의 특징이다.

2. 주체의 출현과 존재 가짐: ‘여기’와 ‘지금’

레비나스는 주체의 성립 과정을 익명적 혼돈 상태인 ‘존재자 없는 존재,’ 곧 ‘존재한다’는 동사로부터 ‘존재자’라고 일컬을 수 있는 명사의 출현으로 이해한다.

레비나스의 홀로 서기로서의 주체는 존재의 익명성에 매몰되지 않고 존재를 자기 것으로 소유한다. 주체는 익명적인 존재의 속성에서 존재를 자신의 속성으로 만든다. 존재는 주체의 출현으로 인해 더 이상 이름과 얼굴 없는 존재, 시작과 끝이 없는 존재가 아니라 주체의 소유가 된다.

하이데거에 따르면 현존재는 ‘엑지스텐츠,’ 즉 자기 ‘밖에 서는 존재’이다. 다시 말해 현존재는 자기 자신을 떠나, 밖으로, 세계로 향해 초월하는 존재이다… 레비나스는 하이데거와 달리 주체의 근원적인, 일차적인 존재방식을 ‘홀로 서기’로 본다. 주체는 먼저 밖에서 안으로의 운동이다. 안으로의 운동, 내재성의 성립이 선행된 다음, 안에서 밖으로의 초월이 가능하다.

‘여기’: 주체 구성 요건으로서의 장소성

레비나스에 따르면 의식 주체를 통한 ‘존재’ 극복은 존재 속에서의 주체의 ‘자기 정립’ ‘자리 잡기’를 통해 가능하다.

주체는 의식이 하나의 장소 속에 자리함 (장소화)을 통해 주체로서 서게 된다. 주체는 여기, 이곳에 존재하고, 이곳을 출발점으로 삼아 세계로 향해 나아간다.

주체를 ‘여기’에 위치시키는 것은 의식에 출발점을 제공할 뿐  아니라 주체가 자기 자신에게 돌아올 수 있는 가능성을 제공한다. 주체는 그러면 무엇을 통해 ‘여기’와 관계하는가? 주체가 구체적인 장소와 관계하는 통로를, 레비나스는 놀랍게도 잠이라고 말한다… ‘주체가 된다’는 것은 자기 자신으로부터 출발할 수 있고 동시에 자기 자신으로 되돌아올 수 있음을 뜻한다.

의식이 ‘여기에 자리 잡기’ 위한 구체적인 가능 조건은 신체이다.

이제 주체는 두 가지 방식으로 규정되고 있음을 알게 된다. 주체는 한편으로 익명적인 존재 사건으로부터의 해방으로, 또 다른 한편으로는 개체적인 독립체로 ‘여기’에 자신을 정립하는 자로 규정된다.

‘여기’에 자리 잡음은 ‘순간’ ‘현재’와 관계한다. 주체는 ‘지금’ 순간의 홀로 서기로서 가능하다. 의식이 자리를 잡음으로써 순간이 현재로서 구성된다. ‘현재로서의 순간’은 무엇을 뜻하는가?

‘지금’: 주체 구성 요건으로서의 순간

레비나스가 드러내는 ‘순간’은 ‘존재’에서 떨어져 나온 순간이다.

새로운 탄생으로서의 순간은 존재의 시작이고 존재의 정복이다.

‘순간으로서의 현재’는 어떻게 가능한가? 레비나스는 순수 ‘존재’로부텉 독립적인 존재자의 출현, 곧 순수 ‘존재’의 어둠으로부터 자기 자신을 주장하는 주체의 출현을 통해서 ‘순간으로서의 현재’가 가능하다고 생각한다… 주체는 ‘존재’의 중립적인 비시간성에 대항하여 스스로 시작함으로써 ‘순간’을 만들고 순간에 이름을 부여한다. 현재, 곧 순간으로서의 현재는 과거와 미래와 관계하기 전에 주체가 자기 자신에 현존하는 순간이다. 순간으로서의 현재는 ‘주체의 실현’이다. 자기 자신에의 현존, 자기 자신에 대한 관계, 자기 자신으로부터의 출발과 복귀, 이것으로 인해 새로운 ‘지금,’ 새로운 ‘시작’이 시작될 수 있다.

자기 자신과의 관계, 자기 자신으로 돌아옴으로써 주체는 ‘자기’로서, 자기 자시과 동일한 존재로서 자신을 확인한다. 주체는 어떤 다른 것을 통해서, 다른 것과의 관계에서 ‘자기’로서 정립하는 것이 아니라 오직 자신과의 관계를 통해서 자기 동일성을 유지한다. 주체는 단순한 존재자가아니라 자기 자신을 소유하는 존재자이다. 주체의 자기 동일성은 내재성, 즉 자기 자신과의 친숙성이다. 자기 동일성은 실체 속에 고정된 것이 아니라 순간마다 자기를 확인할 때 성립되는 역동적 과정이다. 익명적인 순수 존재에 맞서 ‘순간마다’ 자기 자신을 확인하는 행위를 통해 주체는 자기 자신으로 설 수 있다.

주체가 자기 자신에서 시작할 수 있다는 것, 자신을 다시 새로운 시작의 기점으로 삼을 수 있다는 것은, 레비나스에게서는 인간의 근원적인 자유를 설명하는 실마리가 된다.

레비나스가 말하는 근원적 자유는 이것 또는 저것을 선택하기 이전에 자신을 정립하고 자신으로서 시작할 수 있는 자유이다. 이 자유는 주체로서의 주체의 출현을 가능케 하는 자유요, 존재의 익명성 속에 함몰되지 않고 자신으로서 자신의 존재를 유지할 수 있는 자유이다.

3. 존재의 무거움과 초월의 욕망

그러나 주체의 자유는 절대적이 아니다. 익명적인 존재를 자신의 존재로 수용한다는 것은 한편으로는 존재의 정복이나 다른 한 편으로는 존재의 ‘무게’를 자신의 어깨에 걸머짐을 뜻한다. 존재의 익명성이 안겨주는 공포감을 벗어나, 스스로 자신의 존재를 지탱하는 주체로 설 때, 주체가 자신에 대해 갖는 책임, 존재에 관해 갖는 무거움이 바로 이 자유이다. 그러므로 주체가 누리는 자유는 역설적이다.

주체의 등장과 함께 ‘세계’가 등장한다. 주체는 여기, 지금 자신을 구성함으로써 비로소 하이데거적인 ‘세계 안의 존재’가 된다. 이렇게 보면 ‘세계 안의 존재’는 익명적 존재 사건으로부터 홀로 서는 존재자의 출현을 전제한다. 홀로 서는 존재자는 ‘지금’ ‘여기’에 신체적으로 자신을 구성함으로써 존재에 자신을 내맡기지 안고 오히려 존재를 자신의 것으로 소유한다. 존재는 이제 ‘나의 존재’가 되고 ‘존재 가짐’은 주체의 물질성과 분리되지 않는다.

존재의 무거움, 주체가 자신에 매여 있어야 하는 비극, ‘홀로 서기’의 무게를 지탱해야 하는 괴로움에서 벗어날 수 있는 공간을 레비나스는 일단 ‘세계’라고 부른다… ‘향유’는 하나의 존재 방식이다. 인식, 과학, 노동, 소유, 이 모든 것을 레비나스는 ‘향유’로 이해한다.

레비나스는 인식, 즉 우리의 지적인 작업을 통해 존재의 전체성을 초월할 수 있는 가능성이 없음을 힘주어 강조한다. 그것은 무엇 때문인가?

레비나스의 설명에 따르면 나와 다른 것은 결국 나를 통해 인식된다… 인식에는 환원할 수 없는 낯선 요소가 개입되어 있다… 인식은 물질성에 사로잡힌 주체를, 물질성과 거리를 두게 해주지만 그것으로부터 완전히 해방시켜주지 못한다… 유아론은 궤변이나 일탈이 아니라 이성의 본질적 구조이다… 인식은 [전체성과 무한]의 표현을 빌려 말하자면 전체성의 틀을 스스로 깨뜨릴 수 없다. 그러면 존재의 무거움으로부터의 해방, ‘존재 저편으로’ ‘존재와 다른’ 차원으로의 초월이 어떻게 가능한가?

4. ‘존재 너머로’이 초월: 고통과 죽음

레비나스의 관심은 존재 저편으로의 초월을 그려내는 일이다… 무엇이 그와 같은 현상을 보여주는 경험인가? 고통과 죽음이 바로 그 경험이다.

고통은 ‘무의 불가능성’이다. 존재의 매임으로부터 도무지 빠져나갈 구멍이 없는 것이 곧 고통이다.

죽음을 알 수 없는 것, 나에게서 유래되지 않은 것, 하나의 신비로 묘사함으로써 레비나스는 익명적 존재 사건에서 존재를 자신의 존재로 소유하는 주체의 능동성이 완전히 수동성으로 전환됨을 보여준다. 고통 속에서 죽음과 갖는 관계는 수동성의 경험이다… 죽음은 모든 ‘가능성의 불가능성’이다.

죽음에 대한 레비나스의 묘사는 하이데거의 관점과 전혀 다르다. 현존재의 존재 방식을 ‘죽음으로 향한 존재’로 볼 때 하이데거가 염두에 둔 것은 주체의 자유이다. 현존재는 자신이 죽음에 이르는 존재라는 의식을 통해 자신의 존재를 소유하고 미래를 기획할 수 있다. 죽음은 현존재에게 있어서 모든 다른 가능성을 가능케 하는 최고의 가능성, ‘불가능성의 가능성’을 뜻한다. 죽음은 그러므로 하이데거 철학에서는 자유의 사건이다.

죽음은 ‘절대 타자,’ 나와는 ‘전적으로 다른 것’이 있음을 보여주는 존재론적 사건이다… 죽음은 주체의 고독 (홀로 서기)을 깨뜨린다. 주체는 자신의 존재에 갇혀 있던 자리에서 전적으로 다른 타자를 만나게 된다.

타자의 존재는 나의 내면성과 구별되는 외재성이고 그야말로 이타성이다. 그러므로 레비나스는 타자와의 관계를 ‘공감’이나 ‘감정 이입’ 또는 ‘신비로운 연합’으로 볼 수 없다고 강조해서 말한다. 이와 같은 용어들은 여전히 존재 이편, 존재 안에서의 존재자와 존재자의 관계를 표시하기 때문이다.

5. 시간과 타자: 타자와의 만남

레비나스에 따르면 죽음을 통한 절대 타자와의 관계는 인간에게 미래를 열어준다… 홀로 서기 자체에는 미래가 없다… 손에 거머쥘 수 없고 내가 지배할 수 없다는 의미에서 미래는 나에게 타자이다. 미래와의 관계는 곧 타자와의 관계이다.

미래와 현재가 연결될 수 있는 가능성은 어디에 있는가? 그 가능성을 레비나스는 이미 [시간과 타자]에서 탙자의 얼굴과의 만남에서 찾는다.

레비나스의 타자 개념에서 특이한 것은 타자를 단지 ‘다른 자아’로 보지 않는다는 점이다. 타자는 나의 공감과 연민, 감정 이입의 대상이 아니다…. 레비나스가 말하는 타인은 성격과 외모, 심리와 상관없이 단지 내가 아니며, 나와 다르다는 사실만으로 수용하고 인정하는 타자이다.

타인은 나와 대칭적 관계, 나와 대등하게 맞설 수 있는 사람이 아니라 내가 전혀 예기치 못하고 전혀 나의 틀 속에 집어넣을 수 없는 사람이다 (고아와 과부와 가난한 자들).

6. 타자성과 여성성

레비나스는 존재의 전체성이 깨어질 수 있는 또 다른 예로 에로스의 경험을 든다. 전적으로 다른 것, 타자의 타자성, 그리고 내 자신의 존재를 유지하면서 타자가 존재 사건 속에 개입될 수 있는 가능성을 여성적인 것과의 관계, 곧 성애를 통해 발견할 수 있다고 레비나스는 생각한다… 레비나스에 따르면 성행위는 합일과 혼융 또는 용해 관계가 아니라 전적으로 다른 타자와의 만남이고 나로 환원할 수 없는 타자의 타자성을 체험하는 장소이다. 타자성은 성 관계를 통해 소멸되기는커녕 더 인정되고 유지된다… 성 관계에서 만나는 타인은 내가 손에 거머쥘 수 없는 신비 속에 있다.

‘여성성’이란 개념에는 신비로운 것, 알 수 없는 것뿐만 아니라 어떤 ‘빛’도 그 안으로 침투할 수 없다는 생각이 담겨 있다… 여성적인 것의 존재 방식 자체가 스스로 숨는 것이기 때문이다.

레비나스는 타자의 타자성을 만나는 원초적 경험을 에로스, 즉 성애에서 찾는다. 에로스에는 이론적 인식이나 투쟁이 개입되지 않는다. 고통과 죽음의 도래를 통해 열린 타자의 공간은 이제 에로스를 통해 인격적 타자, 전적인 타자로서의 타인을 만날 수 있는 공간으로 확대된다.

애무는 여자를 접촉하는 가운데 여자가 아닌 또 다른 하나의 타자를 접촉하는 행위이다… 뭔가를 알지 못한다는 것이 애무의 본질이다… 애무는 이런 의미에서 ‘순수한, 내용 없는 미래’에 대한 기대이고 ‘손에 쥘 수 없는 것’에 대한 굶주림으로 충만해 있다.성교도 이와 같은 관점에서 이해된다.

죽음은 주체의 종말을 뜻하는 것이 아닌가? 그리고 너의 타자성 속에서 나를 상실하지 않고 나의 존재를 유지할 수 있는가? 레비나스는 ‘어버이란 존재’ 또는 ‘부모 자식 관계’에서 이 물음에 대한 답을 찾는다. 어버이와 아이의 관계를 “전혀 다른 사람이면서 동시에 내 자신인 낯선 이와의 관계,” 또는 “나와, 그사이 나에게 낯선 이가 된 내 자신과의 관계”로 묘사한다.

주체는 어버이가 됨으로써 그의 이기주의, 자신에게로의 영원한 회귀로부터 해방된다. 주체는 이제 타자와 타자의 미래 속에서 자신의 한계를 초월한다. 출산성을 통해 주체는 자기 자신의 유한성으로부터 구원받는다. 아이의 출산으로 새로운 미래, 전혀 예상할 수 없는 새로운 가능성이 열리게 된다.

7. 타자성의 철학으로

‘존재론적 모험’은 ‘나’라고 부를 수 있는 신체적 존재자 (주체)가 익명적 존재 사건으로부터 출현하여 타자와의 관계에 들어서는 과정이다. 이것을 레비나스는 ‘변증법’ 또는 ‘존재의 변증법’이라고 부른다.

초기의 레비나스 철학은 슈트라서가 적절하게 표현하듯 ‘존재론 비판’이다. 레비나스 철학의 목표는 존재를 동일성으로 환원하거나 또는 중성적 존재로 보아온 전통적인 서양 철학의 존재론을 비판하고 그것을 극복하자는 데 있다.

이런 이유 때문에 레비나스는 뒤르케임처럼 합일이나 통합을 이상적 사회 관계로 보는 이론을 비판한다.

레비나스의 철학은 초기부터 벌써 ‘타자의 사유’요, ‘타자의 철학’임을 나타내 보인다.